LAISHA
Open Laisha

IRMA PGDM (Rural Management) selection

India · Institute of Rural Management Anand · secondary source

86practice questions written to this syllabus
5subjects

What IRMA PGDM selection is

IRMA PGDM (Rural Management) selection is a postgraduate admission exam run by Institute of Rural Management Anand, for candidates in India.

Format

Shortlisting on CAT, XAT or CMAT scores, then a Written Ability Test (200-300 words) and personal interview.

Sections

We have not been able to confirm these details against the exam body's own specification, so fees, dates and pass marks are left out on purpose.

Check the current format, eligibility, fees and dates on the official site: irma.ac.in.

How it has changed

The shortlisting route (CAT/XAT/CMAT) is from IRMA's programme page; the weights are from pw.live. History: IRMA's own 2018 handout describes IRMASAT as 40 MCQs on 'Issues of Social Concern', 5 options, -1/4 (https://www.irma.ac.in/pdf/admission_other_download/143.pdf). The 2019 cycle used IRMASAT + group activity + PI with shortlisting on CAT/XAT/GMAT/GRE. The WAT replaced IRMASAT from the 2023 cycle. The first year of IRMASAT is not verified.

How to prepare for IRMA PGDM selection

Where our 86 questions for it fall

Our reading of the syllabus, from the questions we have written to this exam; the exam body's own weighting, where published, is under Format above.

  1. Heaviest (67% of the questions): Business Communication (37); Rural Society, Polity & Institutions (21).

    Start here: read these subjects' manuals first and work their questions until the reasoning is automatic.

  2. Middle band: Institutional Economics (18); Business Statistics & Quantitative Methods (6).

    One pass per subject, then mixed sets across them.

  3. Lighter: Rural Development, Local Governance & Livelihoods (4).

    Definitions, classifications and standard figures; quick to revise, easy marks to lose.

  4. Hardest share: Rural Development, Local Governance & Livelihoods (2 hard of 4), Rural Society, Polity & Institutions (10 hard of 21), Business Communication (10 hard of 37).

    Leave untimed time for these and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

Official source: irma.ac.in

8 practice questions, worked

Original questions written to this exam's published syllabus and pattern. Not past papers.

1. Which force is NOT emphasised by Hayami and Ruttan as a source of demand for institutional change?

  1. A random shift in voters' tastes unrelated to prices
  2. New technology that raises the return to securing rights in land
  3. Growth of markets that raises the value of output from a resource
  4. A change in the relative scarcity and hence the prices of land and labour
Answer and working

A. A random shift in voters' tastes unrelated to prices

In the induced institutional innovation model, demand for change comes from shifts in relative factor and product prices and from technical change, which alter the gains from new arrangements. A random taste shift unrelated to economic conditions is not part of their demand side (culture enters on the supply side).

Institutional Economics · Institutional change

2. A company wants to introduce a new seed-treatment practice to farmers with low literacy in a village meeting. Which plan is most likely to succeed?

  1. A slide presentation in English with detailed dosage tables so that farmers can see the precise figures
  2. A printed leaflet handed out at the gate with full technical instructions and the chemical names in it
  3. A demonstration with the actual product, local units and language, and asking farmers to repeat the steps back
  4. A recorded video of a national expert explaining the science, played once at the start of the meeting
Answer and working

C. A demonstration with the actual product, local units and language, and asking farmers to repeat the steps back

Low-literacy rural audiences learn best by seeing and doing, in their own language and units, with understanding checked by teach-back. English slides and dense leaflets ignore literacy and language; a single passive video shows no local relevance and gives no check of understanding.

Business Communication · Presentations

3. A crop matrix scores three crops on income (weight 3), risk (weight 2) and labour demand (weight 1), each on a 1-5 scale where higher is better. Crop A scores 4, 2, 3; crop B scores 3, 5, 2; crop C scores 5, 1, 1. Which crop ranks first on the weighted score?

  1. Crop C, with 18
  2. Crop A, with 19
  3. Crop B, with 10
  4. Crop B, with 21
Answer and working

D. Crop B, with 21

Weighted: A = 4x3 + 2x2 + 3x1 = 19; B = 3x3 + 5x2 + 2x1 = 21; C = 5x3 + 1x2 + 1x1 = 18. B ranks first with 21. 'Crop B, with 10' is the unweighted total (3 + 5 + 2), which happens to give the same rank here but the wrong score.

Rural Society, Polity & Institutions · Social, political and economic structure of rural societies

4. A processor's contract growers side-sell whenever spot prices rise well above the fixed contract price, while the processor rejects more produce on 'quality' grounds when spot prices fall. Which redesign best addresses both problems?

  1. A higher fixed contract price set once a year, with grading by the processor's own field staff
  2. Legal action against side-sellers, with no change to price formula or quality grading
  3. A base price plus a share of any spot premium, with grading by an independent third party
  4. A contract that pays the spot price at delivery, with no commitment to buy any quantity
Answer and working

C. A base price plus a share of any spot premium, with grading by an independent third party

A risk-sharing formula narrows the gap between spot and contract prices when markets rise (reducing the side-selling gain), and independent grading makes quality verifiable, limiting opportunistic rejection. A higher fixed price still leaves a gap in booms and does nothing about grading; a pure spot-price contract abandons the assurance both sides need; litigation is slow and costly with weak courts.

Institutional Economics · Institutions and resource allocation

5. Participatory budgeting, in which citizens' assemblies decide on part of municipal investment, began in 1989 in:

  1. Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India
  2. Porto Alegre, Brazil
  3. La Paz, Bolivia
  4. Nairobi, Kenya
Answer and working

B. Porto Alegre, Brazil

Porto Alegre began participatory budgeting in 1989 and it spread worldwide. Kerala's People's Plan Campaign (1996) is a related Indian experience of decentralised planning; Bolivia's Popular Participation Law dates from 1994.

Rural Society, Polity & Institutions · Local self-government institutions in rural areas

6. A farmer whose crop failed after using a company's seed comes to the dealer visibly upset. The dealer's first aim should be to understand the farmer's feelings and point of view without judging. This is

  1. discriminative listening
  2. empathic listening
  3. critical listening
  4. appreciative listening
Answer and working

B. empathic listening

Empathic (therapeutic) listening seeks to understand the speaker's feelings and perspective without judgement, which is the first need with an upset customer; facts can be checked afterwards. Critical listening judges evidence and logic, discriminative listening separates sounds and tones, and appreciative listening is for enjoyment.

Business Communication · Listening

7. Bruce Tuckman's stages of group development, in order, are

  1. forming, storming, norming, performing, adjourning
  2. storming, forming, norming, performing, adjourning
  3. forming, storming, performing, norming, adjourning
  4. forming, norming, storming, performing, adjourning
Answer and working

A. forming, storming, norming, performing, adjourning

Tuckman's sequence is forming, storming, norming, performing, with adjourning added later. The other orders swap stages; conflict (storming) normally comes before the group settles its norms.

Business Communication · Meetings

8. A contract farmer's price is 20 per kg and the spot price at harvest rises to 24 per kg. The farmer has 100 kg. What is the one-season gain from side-selling the whole crop?

  1. 40
  2. 2,000
  3. 2,400
  4. 400
Answer and working

D. 400

Gain = (24 − 20) × 100 = 400. 2,400 is the total spot revenue and 2,000 the contract revenue, not the difference; 40 drops a zero from the quantity.

Institutional Economics · Institutions and resource allocation

Last updated · How Laisha writes and checks its pages · Report a mistake

Ask Laisha about this

Opens Laisha's chat with your question ready to send. Sign in or start free.

Unlock all 86 questions — IRMA PGDM (Rural Management) selection

US$10 a month · one price worldwide · cancel any time

  • Every practice question for this course, with explanations
  • Timed papers for the exams this course leads to
  • Ask Laisha to explain any topic — up to 1,000 questions a month
Free or Smarter
FreeSmarter
Grow guides, pest pages, articlesRead allRead all
Ask Laisha5 a dayUp to 1,000 a month
Exam practiceThe sample on each pageEvery question, timed papers
Crop calendar and pest alerts—For your own fields
Calculators and tools—All
Uploads and reports—100 a month, real files
10 days free for every new account, no card.