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ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment Institutional Economics: practice questions

ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment · India · Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (ICAR)

Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papers
10worked here, free
44written to this exam in this subject
8syllabus units

About ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment

ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment is a professional certification run by Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (ICAR), for candidates in India. NET: one paper of 150 objective questions at 1 mark each, 2 hours, -1/3 negative, online, English or Hindi, Master's level. ARS: qualifying prelims, then mains 240 and interview 60.

Official site: pw.live.

We have not been able to confirm these details against the exam body's own specification, so fees, dates and pass marks are left out on purpose. Check the current format, eligibility, fees and dates on the official site.

Institutional Economics in ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment

Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.

Our 44 ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment questions in this subject: 27 easy, 17 medium, 0 hard, across 8 units.

10 practice questions, worked

Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.

These 10 were written to ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment and are not shown on any other exam's page.

Question 1 · easy

Douglass North defined institutions as

  1. the set of market prices that coordinate the decisions of buyers and sellers
  2. the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction, or the rules of the game
  3. the physical infrastructure of roads, markets and warehouses in a country
  4. the firms, cooperatives and agencies that act as players in an economy
Answer and working

B. the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction, or the rules of the game

North (1990) called institutions 'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. Firms, cooperatives and agencies are organisations — the players — which North deliberately kept distinct from the rules. Prices and physical infrastructure are not institutions in his sense.

Question 2 · medium

Which pair of economists shared the 2009 Nobel prize for analysis of economic governance?

  1. Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz
  2. Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson
  3. Douglass North and Robert William Fogel
  4. Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström
Answer and working

B. Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson

Ostrom (governance of the commons) and Williamson (governance and the boundaries of the firm) shared the 2009 prize. North and Fogel shared 1993; Hart and Holmström shared 2016 for contract theory; Coase won alone in 1991 and Demsetz did not receive the prize.

Question 3 · medium

A sugar mill relies on cane grown within a short radius because cut cane loses sucrose quickly and is costly to haul far. The type of asset specificity involved is chiefly

  1. site specificity
  2. brand-name capital
  3. human asset specificity
  4. dedicated asset specificity
Answer and working

A. site specificity

Site specificity arises when successive stages are located close together to save transport and inventory costs, so assets are immobile once placed. Brand-name capital concerns reputation; human asset specificity concerns job-specific skill; dedicated assets are general-purpose capacity added for one buyer.

Question 4 · easy

Which of the following is an ex post transaction cost?

  1. Haggling over price after a quality dispute at delivery
  2. Searching for a reliable buyer before the crop is even planted
  3. Checking a new trading partner's reputation
  4. Drafting the clauses of a supply contract
Answer and working

A. Haggling over price after a quality dispute at delivery

Ex post costs arise after the agreement: haggling, adaptation, dispute settlement, enforcement. Searching, drafting and checking reputation all occur before the deal and are ex ante costs.

Question 5 · easy

Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) argued that

  1. property rights emerge whenever the gains from internalising externalities exceed costs
  2. large groups are less likely than small groups to provide collective goods because of free riding
  3. communities always manage common resources better than markets or governments do
  4. any group with a common interest will act to further it, whatever the group's size
Answer and working

B. large groups are less likely than small groups to provide collective goods because of free riding

Olson argued that rational members of large groups free ride, so common interest does not guarantee collective action; small groups do better. 'Any group will act whatever its size' is the view he attacked; 'communities always do better' overstates Ostrom; the internalisation claim is Demsetz.

Question 6 · medium

Two borrowers form a joint-liability group. Each project succeeds independently with probability 0.8, and either successful member can repay for both. What is the probability that the group loan is repaid in full?

  1. 0.80
  2. 0.64
  3. 0.16
  4. 0.96
Answer and working

D. 0.96

The loan fails only if both fail: 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.04, so repayment probability = 1 − 0.04 = 0.96. 0.80 is the individual-loan rate; 0.64 (0.8 × 0.8) is the probability that both succeed, which would be needed only without joint liability; 0.16 is 0.8 × 0.2.

Question 7 · easy

Demsetz (1967) argued that property rights develop when

  1. transaction costs fall to zero so that all externalities disappear
  2. the gains from internalising externalities become larger than the costs of internalisation
  3. religious authorities sanction the private ownership of natural resources
  4. the state decides to raise tax revenue by registering land and other assets
Answer and working

B. the gains from internalising externalities become larger than the costs of internalisation

Demsetz's demand-side theory: rights emerge to internalise externalities when the gain exceeds the cost, illustrated by Labrador hunting territories after the fur trade. Tax motives and religious sanction are not his argument; if transaction costs were zero, internalisation would be costless and rights would always be complete.

Question 8 · medium

Steven Cheung (1969) argued that share tenancy need not be inefficient because

  1. share contracts are usually illegal, so the tenants who use them must be the most efficient
  2. tenants are always risk-neutral, so the share contract gives the same incentives as a fixed rent
  3. the landlord can stipulate and enforce the tenant's labour input and plot size in the contract
  4. the landlord always supplies all variable inputs, leaving the tenant no input decisions to make
Answer and working

C. the landlord can stipulate and enforce the tenant's labour input and plot size in the contract

Cheung's theory of share tenancy treated the contract as specifying inputs as well as shares; with enforcement, resource allocation matches other contracts. He did not assume risk-neutral tenants (risk was central to his choice-of-contract analysis); illegality and full landlord input supply are not his argument.

Question 9 · medium

In many Indian states, laws that ban or tightly restrict land leasing have mainly resulted in

  1. a uniform national fixed-rent system, replacing all share contracts across the states
  2. large increases in recorded tenancy, as tenants register leases to obtain ownership rights
  3. the complete disappearance of tenancy, as owners now cultivate all agricultural land themselves
  4. concealed, oral tenancy that leaves tenants without access to institutional credit and support
Answer and working

D. concealed, oral tenancy that leaves tenants without access to institutional credit and support

Restrictive tenancy laws drive leasing underground; oral, unrecorded tenants cannot show tenancy to obtain institutional credit, insurance or support. Tenancy has not disappeared, recorded tenancy is low precisely because owners fear losing land, and leasing law is a state subject with no uniform national rent system. The Model Agricultural Land Leasing Act, 2016 proposed recording leases while protecting ownership.

Question 10 · easy

An interlinked (interlocked) agrarian transaction is one in which

  1. a government agency buys a crop at a support price and stores it for public distribution
  2. farmers in different villages trade with one another through a regulated wholesale market
  3. two or more exchanges between the same parties are made jointly, with each one's terms depending on the others
  4. a farmer sells his crop on the futures exchange and buys inputs on the spot market
Answer and working

C. two or more exchanges between the same parties are made jointly, with each one's terms depending on the others

Interlinkage ties, for example, credit to land tenancy, labour or output sale between the same pair of parties, with conditional terms. Trade through a regulated market, public procurement and separate futures and spot trades are not interlinked in this sense.

A study plan for Institutional Economics in ASRB NET and ARS / SMS / STO recruitment

This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.

  1. First, the heavy units (52% of the 44 questions): Collective action and the group approach (8, 18%); Transaction costs (8, 18%); Institutions and institutional economics (7, 16%).

    Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.

  2. Then the middle band: Property rights (6, 14%); Tenancy and sharecropping (5, 11%); Institutional change (4, 9%).

    Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.

  3. Then the lighter units: Institutions and resource allocation (4, 9%); Interlinked agrarian markets (2, 5%).

    Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.

  4. Bank the easy marks: Interlinked agrarian markets (2 easy of 2); Collective action and the group approach (6 easy of 8).

    Do these early in revision so they are fast on the day.

  5. Finish timed. Sit the subject as a timed set without notes, mark it, and send each wrong answer back to its unit above.

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