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UGC-NET Institutional Economics: practice questions

UGC-NET (June 2025) · India · National Testing Agency

Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papers
10worked here, free
51written to this exam in this subject
8syllabus units

About UGC-NET

UGC-NET (June 2025) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by National Testing Agency, for candidates in India. CBT (since Dec 2018). Paper I 50 questions / 100 marks; Paper II 100 questions / 200 marks; 180 minutes total; +2, no negative marking.

Source: ugcnet.nta.ac.in.

Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.

Institutional Economics in UGC-NET

Short models worked on paper: share-tenancy input choice, principal-agent incentive and participation constraints, hold-up and quasi-rents, repeated-game cooperation thresholds, open-access versus optimal effort; and the institutions-and-development literature (North, Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson, critiques).

Why institutions and transaction costs matter for how agricultural resources are used, and how agrarian institutions such as tenancy work.

Our 51 UGC-NET questions in this subject: 10 easy, 23 medium, 18 hard, across 8 units.

10 practice questions, worked

Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.

These 10 were written to UGC-NET and are not shown on any other exam's page.

Question 1 · hard

What did Coase himself regard as the main policy lesson of 'The Problem of Social Cost'?

  1. Since real transaction costs are positive, the legal assignment of rights and the choice of institution affect efficiency
  2. Since property rights are costly, all externality problems should be solved through public ownership of resources
  3. Since harm is reciprocal, the party causing physical damage should always be taxed at the rate of marginal damage
  4. Since bargaining always reaches efficiency, the state need never intervene in disputes over harmful effects
Answer and working

A. Since real transaction costs are positive, the legal assignment of rights and the choice of institution affect efficiency

Coase stressed that the zero-cost world is a benchmark; because transaction costs are positive, law and institutional choice matter, and each remedy (liability, regulation, tax, merger) must be compared at its real cost. The 'never intervene' reading is a common misreading; automatic Pigovian taxation and blanket public ownership were exactly the one-size answers he criticised.

Question 2 · medium

According to Williamson's discriminating alignment hypothesis, as asset specificity rises from low to high the efficient governance structure moves

  1. from market to hybrid to hierarchy
  2. from market to hierarchy to hybrid
  3. from hybrid to market to hierarchy
  4. from hierarchy to hybrid to market
Answer and working

A. from market to hybrid to hierarchy

Markets have strong incentives and autonomous adaptation, best when assets are generic; hierarchies have strong coordinated adaptation, best when specificity creates bilateral dependency; hybrids fit in between (Williamson 1991).

Question 3 · medium

China's household responsibility system, spreading from about 1978, is a standard example of institutional change because it

  1. transferred full private ownership of farmland, including the right to sell it, to individual rural households
  2. abolished state grain procurement and let all prices be set by world markets from the start
  3. replaced household farming with large state farms run by salaried managers and wage workers
  4. returned farming decisions and residual output to households while land stayed collectively owned
Answer and working

D. returned farming decisions and residual output to households while land stayed collectively owned

Under the household responsibility system households contracted for land from the collective, delivered a quota and kept the residual, which sharply improved incentives; land ownership remained collective, so full private ownership did not occur. It moved away from, not toward, state farms, and procurement and price reforms were gradual.

Question 4 · easy

Akerlof's 'market for lemons' (1970) shows that

  1. when buyers cannot observe quality, good-quality sellers may leave and the market can unravel
  2. when property rights are clear, bargaining always yields an efficient allocation of goods
  3. when transaction costs are high, firms vertically integrate to avoid opportunism
  4. when sellers are numerous, prices fall to marginal cost and quality typically rises to the efficient level
Answer and working

A. when buyers cannot observe quality, good-quality sellers may leave and the market can unravel

Akerlof's adverse-selection model: buyers pay for average quality, so owners of good units withdraw, lowering average quality further. Prices falling to marginal cost describes competition, efficient bargaining is the Coase theorem, and integration to avoid opportunism is TCE.

Question 5 · easy

Elinor Ostrom's best-known book on the self-governance of common-pool resources is

  1. The Mystery of Capital (2000)
  2. Governing the Commons (1990)
  3. Why Nations Fail (2012)
  4. Markets and Hierarchies (1975)
Answer and working

B. Governing the Commons (1990)

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990) set out her design principles. Markets and Hierarchies is Williamson's; The Mystery of Capital is de Soto's; Why Nations Fail is Acemoglu and Robinson's.

Question 6 · hard

Some collective-action problems are better modelled as an assurance (stag-hunt) game than a prisoner's dilemma. The key difference is that in an assurance game

  1. cooperating is the best reply when others cooperate, so the problem is building mutual trust
  2. payoffs are zero-sum, so any gain to one member must equal a loss to another member
  3. only one player moves, so there is no strategic interaction among the group members
  4. defecting is a dominant strategy, so cooperation can never be an equilibrium of the game
Answer and working

A. cooperating is the best reply when others cooperate, so the problem is building mutual trust

In a stag hunt, mutual cooperation and mutual defection are both equilibria; a player prefers to cooperate if he expects others to, so expectations and trust decide the outcome. A dominant strategy to defect describes the prisoner's dilemma; single-mover and zero-sum descriptions do not fit either game.

Question 7 · hard

Besley (1995) found that stronger land rights were associated with more tree planting in parts of Ghana but cautioned about interpretation. Why?

  1. Tree planting is a consumption good, so it cannot be counted as investment in any economic analysis
  2. Stronger rights always reduce investment, so the correlation must reflect an omitted price effect
  3. Planting trees can itself strengthen land claims, so investment may cause rights rather than rights cause investment
  4. Ghanaian land is entirely state-owned, so measured rights can only be a statistical error in the survey
Answer and working

C. Planting trees can itself strengthen land claims, so investment may cause rights rather than rights cause investment

In many customary systems planting trees helps establish a claim, so causation can run from investment to rights; Besley used instruments to address this. Tree planting is investment; Ghanaian land is largely under customary tenure, not entirely state-owned; theory predicts rights raise investment, not reduce it.

Question 8 · hard

Barzel's analysis of property rights adds which insight to Demsetz's?

  1. Rights are irrelevant to efficiency because competitive markets allocate resources well under any rights
  2. Rights are always complete once a title is issued, so the cost of measuring attributes is irrelevant to allocation
  3. Rights emerge only through state legislation and never through private agreement or custom among users
  4. Rights are never complete; attributes too costly to measure are left in the public domain and people spend resources capturing them
Answer and working

D. Rights are never complete; attributes too costly to measure are left in the public domain and people spend resources capturing them

Barzel emphasised that because measuring every attribute of an asset is costly, rights are partly delineated, leaving some value in the 'public domain' to be captured, which shapes contracts and organisation. Titles do not make rights complete; customs and private agreements also create rights; and rights clearly affect efficiency when transaction costs are positive.

Question 9 · medium

A tenant gets half the output but pays the full cost of fertiliser. Heady (1947) showed that the distortion in fertiliser use can be removed by

  1. converting the share contract to a contract that pays the tenant a wage
  2. sharing the cost of fertiliser in the same proportion as the output
  3. making the landlord pay the whole cost of fertiliser applied to the plot
  4. fixing the quantity of fertiliser by law for every crop in the district
Answer and working

B. sharing the cost of fertiliser in the same proportion as the output

If the landlord pays share (1 − s) of the input cost, the tenant equates s × MP to s × price, which reduces to MP = price — the efficient rule. If the landlord paid all of it, the tenant would over-apply; a wage contract changes effort incentives; legal quantities ignore variation between plots.

Question 10 · hard

Critics of Bhaduri's semi-feudalism thesis argued that a landlord-lender facing a yield-raising innovation would generally prefer to

  1. sell the land to the tenant, since innovation makes landlordism unprofitable in every case
  2. adopt it and recover the lost interest income by adjusting the crop share or loan terms
  3. block it permanently, since interest income always exceeds the landlord's share of extra output
  4. stop lending altogether, since innovation makes tenants' borrowing demand fall to zero
Answer and working

B. adopt it and recover the lost interest income by adjusting the crop share or loan terms

Because the landlord can renegotiate the share and the interest rate together, he can capture the extra surplus from innovation, so blocking it is usually not optimal (Braverman, Stiglitz, Srinivasan and others), though resistance can arise in special contract structures. The 'always block' claim is the thesis being criticised; the other options are not the critics' argument.

A study plan for Institutional Economics in UGC-NET

This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.

  1. First, the heavy units (45% of the 51 questions): Tenancy and sharecropping (9, 18%); Institutions and resource allocation (7, 14%); Transaction costs (7, 14%).

    Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.

  2. Then the middle band: Institutional change (6, 12%); Institutions and institutional economics (6, 12%); Interlinked agrarian markets (6, 12%).

    Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.

  3. Then the lighter units: Collective action and the group approach (5, 10%); Property rights (5, 10%).

    Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.

  4. Leave time for the hard ones: Tenancy and sharecropping (5 hard of 9), Interlinked agrarian markets (3 hard of 6), Collective action and the group approach (2 hard of 5).

    Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

  5. Bank the easy marks: Collective action and the group approach (2 easy of 5); Institutions and institutional economics (2 easy of 6).

    Do these early in revision so they are fast on the day.

  6. Finish timed. Sit the subject as a timed set without notes, mark it, and send each wrong answer back to its unit above.

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