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ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF Cooperatives & Farmer Producer Organisations: practice questions

ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF (PhD admission and fellowship) · India · National Testing Agency for ICAR

Original practice questions written to the published syllabus · not past papers
10worked here, free
30written to this exam in this subject
10syllabus units

About ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF

ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF (PhD admission and fellowship) is a PhD, fellowship and lectureship exam run by National Testing Agency for ICAR, for candidates in India. LAN-based CBT, 2 hours, 120 MCQs, 480 marks, +4 / -1. 2026 exam on 4 July 2026. 72 subjects at 122 cities.

Source: cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in.

Checked against the exam body's published information. Formats and fees change; confirm the current edition there before you book.

Cooperatives & Farmer Producer Organisations in ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF

Farmer-owned businesses: cooperative principles and history, how cooperatives and producer companies are governed and managed, and the public programmes that promote producer organisations.

Our 30 ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF questions in this subject: 0 easy, 15 medium, 15 hard, across 10 units.

10 practice questions, worked

Choose an answer, then open the working. Each explanation says why the right answer is right and why the others are not.

These 10 were written to ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF and are not shown on any other exam's page.

Question 1 · medium

Nourse's 'competitive yardstick' view of agricultural cooperatives holds that:

  1. Even a modest cooperative market share forces other firms to pay fairer prices
  2. Cooperatives should grow to monopolise the market for members' produce and set prices
  3. Cooperatives should compete with each other to set a yardstick price
  4. Government should use cooperatives to fix minimum support prices
Answer and working

A. Even a modest cooperative market share forces other firms to pay fairer prices

Edwin Nourse argued that a cooperative's main value lies in disciplining private traders: farmers have an alternative outlet, so traders must match its prices. He did not advocate monopoly; the competitive yardstick is about competition with investor-owned firms, not between cooperatives.

Question 2 · hard

Older members of a dairy cooperative vote against a plant expansion that will pay off in fifteen years, preferring higher milk prices now, because their claim on the cooperative ends when they stop supplying. In Cook's (1995) terms this is the:

  1. Portfolio problem
  2. Free-rider problem
  3. Influence-cost problem
  4. Horizon problem
Answer and working

D. Horizon problem

The horizon problem arises when a member's residual claim is shorter than the life of the asset, so members underinvest in long-term projects. The free-rider problem concerns new members or non-members enjoying benefits built by others; the portfolio problem concerns members being unable to match investment to their own risk preferences.

Question 3 · medium

Dutch horticultural cooperatives are known for selling through the clock auction. In this auction the price:

  1. Is set by sealed bids opened at the end of the day
  2. Starts high and falls until the first buyer stops the clock
  3. Starts low and rises as buyers bid openly
  4. Is fixed in advance by the cooperative board
Answer and working

B. Starts high and falls until the first buyer stops the clock

The clock auction is a descending-price (Dutch) auction: the first buyer to stop the clock buys at that price. An ascending open auction is the English type; sealed bids and fixed prices are different mechanisms.

Question 4 · hard

A village credit cooperative extends into fertiliser retail, grain storage and procurement. Which risk is most specific to this single-window expansion?

  1. Loss of voting rights by members
  2. Losses in trading lines draining funds needed for credit, because working capital is shared
  3. Higher refinance rates from the development bank for multipurpose societies, which lose their concessional status
  4. Automatic loss of cooperative registration
Answer and working

B. Losses in trading lines draining funds needed for credit, because working capital is shared

Multiple lines share one balance sheet, so stock losses or unsold inventory can impair the credit business; hence separate accounts and cost-covering prices for each line. The other options are not consequences of diversification.

Question 5 · medium

Several countries have created hybrid legal forms for farmer businesses. Which description fits a producer company?

  1. A cooperative society under state cooperative law with unlimited member liability
  2. A listed company in which farmers hold a minority of the tradable shares
  3. A company owned only by producers, with limited return on capital and patronage bonus
  4. A government corporation that buys produce from registered farmers
Answer and working

C. A company owned only by producers, with limited return on capital and patronage bonus

The producer company, introduced in Indian company law in 2002, keeps cooperative features (producer-only membership, democratic voting, limited return on capital, patronage bonus) inside company law. Its shares cannot be listed, and it is neither a state body nor a cooperative society with unlimited liability.

Question 6 · hard

Dutch law lets a cooperative choose the liability of its members on dissolution. A 'UA' cooperative is one in which:

  1. Members' liability is unlimited, as in early Raiffeisen societies
  2. Members' liability for the cooperative's debts is excluded
  3. Members are liable up to a fixed amount set in the articles
  4. Only directors, not members, are liable for any shortfall
Answer and working

B. Members' liability for the cooperative's debts is excluded

Dutch cooperatives choose WA (unlimited), BA (limited) or UA (excluded) liability. Unlimited liability marked early Raiffeisen societies; a fixed cap is the BA form; directors' liability is a separate matter.

Question 7 · hard

A critic argues that the equity grant design favours FPOs that are already well-off. Which feature of the grant supports that argument?

  1. It is paid only to organisations in disadvantaged districts
  2. It is fixed at 1,500,000 currency units for every organisation
  3. It is a matching grant, so organisations whose members can contribute more equity receive more grant
  4. It is given as a loan repayable in five years
Answer and working

C. It is a matching grant, so organisations whose members can contribute more equity receive more grant

Because the grant matches member equity (up to a per-member and a per-organisation cap), organisations with poorer members who can raise little capital get less. The grant is not fixed, not a loan, and not limited to particular districts.

Question 8 · medium

China's household responsibility system from about 1978 is often cited in the collective farming literature because it:

  1. Collectivised private land for the first time
  2. Created the people's communes
  3. Returned land use and residual income to households and was followed by rapid output growth
  4. Abolished all state procurement at once
Answer and working

C. Returned land use and residual income to households and was followed by rapid output growth

The communes (from 1958) were dismantled in favour of household contracting, which restored individual incentives; output rose sharply. It did not create communes, and state procurement was phased, not abolished at once.

Question 9 · hard

Which reason is most consistently given in the literature for the poor performance of compulsory collective farms?

  1. Members were paid too much in cash
  2. Weak individual incentives, because effort and reward are only loosely linked and monitoring is costly
  3. Collective farms had too little land
  4. Collective farms were banned from using machinery
Answer and working

B. Weak individual incentives, because effort and reward are only loosely linked and monitoring is costly

When pay is shared across a large group and effort is hard to monitor, individuals shirk; incentive problems grow with group size. Collective farms were typically large and mechanised, so the land and machinery options are wrong.

Question 10 · hard

Compared with a cooperative, which feature of a producer company makes it potentially more attractive to lenders?

  1. Its directors bear unlimited liability
  2. It is exempt from audit
  3. Its shares can be pledged and sold on a stock exchange
  4. It is governed by uniform company law with standard filings and less scope for registrar interference
Answer and working

D. It is governed by uniform company law with standard filings and less scope for registrar interference

Lenders value predictable governance and disclosure under company law. Producer company shares are not tradable on exchanges, members' liability is limited, and audit is required.

A study plan for Cooperatives & Farmer Producer Organisations in ICAR AICE-JRF/SRF

This plan follows where our questions actually fall, so the time goes where the marks are likely to be. It is our reading of the syllabus, not the exam body's weighting.

  1. First, the heavy units (63% of the 30 questions): Principles of cooperation (8, 27%); Formation of producer organisations and producer companies (4, 13%); The cooperative movement and the state (4, 13%); Board and professional management of cooperatives (3, 10%).

    Read the manual chapters for these first and do every worked question you can find on them.

  2. Then the middle band: Collective farming (3, 10%); Governance of producer organisations (2, 7%); National cooperative federations (2, 7%); Public programmes to promote producer organisations: membership, management cost support, equity grants and credit guarantees (2, 7%).

    Aim for one sitting per unit, then mixed questions across them.

  3. Then the lighter units: Revitalisation and reform of cooperatives (1, 3%); Single-window input supply and output marketing (1, 3%).

    Learn the definitions, classifications and standard numbers; these units are more often recalled than worked.

  4. Leave time for the hard ones: National cooperative federations (2 hard of 2), Revitalisation and reform of cooperatives (1 hard of 1), Single-window input supply and output marketing (1 hard of 1).

    Come back to these after a first pass, untimed, and read every explanation, including for the options you rejected.

  5. Finish timed. Sit the subject as a timed set without notes, mark it, and send each wrong answer back to its unit above.

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